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IMPROPER ACCUMULATION OF SURPLUS
W. E. NORVELL, JR.*
Section 102 of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, levies an addi-
tional or surtax on corporations. Said Section 102 is entitled "Surtax on
Corporations Improperly Accumulating Surplus." However, this title is
slig htly misleading, in that the purpose is the criterion. Section 102 (a) levies
the said additional tax upon the net income of every corporation (other than
a personial holding company or a foreign personal holding' company)
"if such corporation, however created or organized, is formed or availed of for the
purpose of preventing the imposition of the surtax upon its shareholders or the
shareholders of any other corporation, through the medium of permitting earnings
or profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed, a surtax..." [Italics
added]
Subsection (b) provides that the fact that any corporation is a mere hold-
ing or investment company shall be prima fade evidence of the existence of
such purpose.
Subsection (c) creates a presumption and reads as follows:
"(c) Evidencc Determinative of Plurpose.-The fact that -the earnings or profits
of-a corporation are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the
business shalU be determinative of the purpose to avoid surtax upon shareholders
unless the corporation ,by the clear preponderance of the evidence shall prove to the
contrary,'.' [Italics added]
The remaining subsections of this section apply to definitions and the
computation of "net income," as used in this section.
Income Tax Regulations 111, Sections 29.102-1-4, deal with this sec-
tion.
Section 29.102-2 relates to the purpose to avoid surtax, evidence, burden
of proof and definition of holding or investment company. It states that the
Commissioner's determination that the corporation was formed or availed of
for the purpose of avoiding the individual surtax is subject to disproof by
competent evidence. It states that the existence or non-existence of the purpose
may be indicated by circumtances other than the evidence specified in the
Internal Revenue Code and whether or not such purpose was present "de-
pends upon the particular circumstances of each case." The regulation then
states:
"In other words, a corporation is subject to taxation under section 102 if it is
formed or availed of for the purpose of preventing the imposition of surtax upon
shareholders through the medium of permitting earnings or profits to accumulate,
* Member of Tennessee Bar; Chairman, Committee on Taxation, Nashville Bar.
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even though the corporation is not a mere holding. or investment company and
does not have an unreasonable accumulation of earnings or profits; and on the
other hand, the fact that a corporation is such a company or has an accumulation
is not absolutely conclusive against it if, by clear and convincing evidence, the tax-
payer satisfies the Commissioner that the corporation was neither formed nor
availed of for the purpose of avoiding the individual surtax. All the other circum-
stances which might be construed as evidence of the purpose to avoid surtax can-
not be outlined, but among other things the following will be considered: (1) Deal-
ings between the corporation and its shareholders, such as withdrawals by the
shareholders as personal loans or the expenditure of funds by the corporation for
the personal benefit of the shareholders, and (2) the investment by the corporation
of undistributed earnings in assets having no reasonable connection with the busi-
ness. The mere fact that the corporation distributed a large portion of its earnings
for the year in question does not necessarily prove that earnings were not permitted
to accumulate beyond reasonable needs or that the corporation was not formed or
availed of to avoid surtax upon shareholders.' [Italics added]
Section 29.102-3 touches directly on the question of the unreasonable
accumulation of surplus. The latter part of this section relates to instances
where one corporation is a mere instrumentality of another corporation, and
all of its stock, or substantially all of its stock, is owned by the parent cor-
poration. The first part of this section is as follows:
"29.102-3. Unreasonable accumulation of profits.-An accumulation of earnings
or profits (including the undistributed earnings or profits of prior years) is unreason-
able if it is not required for the purposes of the business, considering all of the cir-
cumstances of the case. It is not intended, however, to prevent accumulations of sur-
plus for the reasonable needs of the business if the purpose is not to prevent the im-
position of the surtax. No attempt is here made to enumerate all the ways in which
earnings or profits of a corporation may be accumulated for the reasonable needs
of the business. Undistributed income is properly accumulated if retained for work-
ing capital needed by the business; or if invested in additions to plant reasonably re-
quired by the business; or if in accordance with contract obligations placed to the
credit of a sinking fund for the purpose of retiring bonds issued by the corporation.
The nature of the investment of earnings or profits is immaterial if they are not in
fact needed in the business. Among other things, the nature of the business, the
financial condition of the corporation at the close of the taxable year, and the use
of the undistributed earnings or profits will be considered in determining the reason-
ableness of the accumulations.
"The business of a corporation is not merely that which it has previously carried
on, but includes in general any line of business which it may undertake. However,
a radical change of business when a considerable surplus has been accumulated may
afford evidence of a purpose to avoid the surtax." [Italics added]
In other words, it should always be borne in mind that it is the purpose
to prevent the imposition of a surtax on shareholders through the medium
of permitting earnings or profits to accumulate, and itot the fact of unreason-
able or unneeded accumulation of earnings or profits. In the case of companies
other than investment companies, it will be noticed from Sections 29.102-2
and 3 of Regulation 111 that while the fact of whether or not there is an un-
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reason.ble accumulation is vok deteiminative, yet if the accumulation is need-
ed in ihe business; that fact is strongly evidentiary in behalf of the taxpayer,
subject; to the exception of radical change in the business when a considerable
surplus has been accumulated.
The riajority of the cases sustaining the Commissioner have involved
corporations which were both formed and availed of to avoid the surtax on
stockholders.' No'case has been found where the. tax has been applied to a
corporation solely because it was formed for the prohibited purpose, when
'its subsequent cofiduct was legitimate, but the Board of Tax Appeals in the
case of Nipoch Corporation v. Commissioner2 said:
"The Commissioner has been sustained in applying, section 104 and its prede-
cessors in a number of cases. But in each of those cases there has been a finding
that the corporation was 'availed of' within the taxable year for the purpose de-
scribed in the statute. No case has come to our attention where the Commissioner
has been sustained solely on theground of the purpose for which a corporation was
'formed.' However, in at least two cases there are. statements to indicate that that
purpose alone would be sufficient. Saenger, Inc. v. Commissioner, 84 Fed. 2d 23
(1936), affirming 33 B.T.A. 135 (1935). Rands; inc., 34 B.T.A. 1094 (1936)."
However, as the tax is levied in the alternative, corporations, though
formed iegitimately and with no su~ch purpose, are subject to the tax if later
there is present the said purpose.
Congress, from the very beginning of the income tax laws, has recog-
nized that the corporate form of doing business and holding property, es-
pecially in closed corporations, might be used to evade or avoid individual
surtax. It, therefore, commencing with the Tariff Act of 1913, has inserted
provisions designed to deter corporations from accumulating surplus beyond
the reasonable requirements of the business. A rather complete history of
the various statutes on that question enacted prior to .the decision of the
Board of Tax Appeals in the case of Mead Corp. v. Commissioner 3 appear
in footnotes to the opinion thereof. Initially, in the Acts of 1913, 1916 and
1918, the tax was levied on the shareholders rather than upon the corpora-
tion, and, indeed, the 1918 Act, Section 220, provided that in such instances
there should be no corporate tax but that the shareholders should be taxed
as in the case of partners in partnerships and in the case of personal service
corporations. In 1921, The Congress, fearful that the entire penal section
might be held invalid, abandoned the idea of taxing the shareholders, and.
introduced the presently operative notion of a penalty tax against corpora-
1. See William C. deMille Productions, Inc., 30 B. T. A. 826 (1934). Olin Corpora-
tion v. Commissioner, 42 B. T. A. 1203 (1940), aff'd, 128 F. 2d 185 (C. C. A. 7th 1942).
See also Suffolk Securities Corp., 41 B. T. A. 1161 (1940), aff'd, 128 F. 2d 743 (C. C. A.
2d 1942).
2. 36 B. T. A. 662, 668 (1937).
3. 38 B. T. A. 687 (1938).
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tions, and that has been the course since the Revenue Act of 1921. Indeed, in
the Acts of 1913 and 1916, the language appeared "formed or fraudidently
availed of for the purpose.... ." Commencing with the Act of 1918 the word
"fraudulently" has been omitted.
The reasons for accumulations will be carefully investigated, especially
in cases of one man corporations and so-called "incorporated talents" com-
panies. In such instances, the tax has usually been applied, although in a
leading case 4 the taxpayer was successful. Further, the fact that the stock
of the corporation is closely held is an apparently important element.
The great majority of the decided cases involve corporations whose
stock, or the stock of whose parent corporation, is owned by a single share-
holder, or by members of a family. There are few decided cases dealing with
large publicly owned corporations. The Trico case 5 involved a corporation
-with over two thousand stockholders, but the controlling interest was held
by a small director-group. Professor Cary denies in an excellent article in
a recent issue of the Harvard Law Review 6 that Trico. is a public corpora-
tion, pointing out that more than 74% of Trico's stock was held by six of the
original shareholders. 7 While earlier income tax regulations provided that a
statutory presumption could be overcome by showing that the stock was
owned "by a large number of persons and in comlparatively small blocks,"
these regulations were subsequently amended 8 and the later regulations now
contain no such provision.
The applicability of the statute, aimed as it is at the "purpose," depends
-upon the participant's state of iind.9 However, it is difficult to prove the
forbidden purpose unless the accumulations are too large for the fair needs
of the business, except in the case of a sudden change of policy coincident
-with large increases in surtax rates, i.e., somewhat along the line of Section
29.102-3 of Income Tax Regulations 111. In the case of United Business
Corporation of America v. Commissioner'o Judge Learned Hand said:
4. Cecil B. De Mille v. Commissioner, 31 B. T. A. 1161 (1935), aff'd, 90 F. 2d 12
(C. C. A. 9th 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 713 (1937).
5. Trico Products Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F. 2d 424 (C. C. A. 2d 1943), cert.
.denied, 320 U. S. 799 (1943).
6. Cary, Accumiulations Beyond the Reasonable Needs of the Business: The Dilemnma
of Sections 102 (C), 60 HARv. L. Rv. 1282 (1947).
7. After the decision in the Trico case a minority shareholder, asserting that the
-penalty surtax had been incurred as the result of the directors' fault, brought an action
against those directors and a company that held part of their stock. This action was
settled, the holding company paying nearly two million dollars and one of the directors
paying more than two hundred thousand dollars. This settlement was approved by the
-court. Mahler v. Oishei, N. Y. Sup. Ct., N. Y. Cty., File No. 28485-1947.
8. T. D. 4470, C. B. XIII-2 at 151.
9. See United Business Corporation of America v. Commissioner, 62 F. 2d 754, 755
(C. C. A. 2d 1933).
10. Ibid.
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"Ordinarily it will indeed be difficult to prove the forbidden purpose, imless the
accuulations are too large for the fair iteeds of the business. But it may not be
impossible to do so, even though the profits arise out of normal business, as they
did not here. The management may for example be shown to have always been
sanguine, and to have withheld only small reserves, though prudence justified more.
A sudden change of policy, coincident with large increases in the surtax rates, might
in that situation betray a purpose to accumulate against a season more propitious
for distribution. Or the officers might unguardedly disclose a scheme to avoid sur-
taxes, though the other evidence was not enough." [Italics added]
That case was decided against the taxpayer; it appeared that the stock
was owned by one man, who was subject to heavy surtaxes, and the corpora-
tion made large loans to him, a fact which usually causes a decision adverse
to the taxpayer.
It was stated in the case of Uited States v. R. C. Tway Coal Sales
Company:'
"This purpose- may be proved unaided by presumption, but the fact that the
surplus is not unreasonably large in respect to the needs of the corporation's business
is repugnant to the existence of such purpose, and, while not conclusive, must be ac-
cepted as substantial evidence in denial of proofs or inferences that it exists."
[Italics added]
The corporation was one engaged in the business of selling coal. The
stock was owned by Mr. Tway and his wife, with two others owning a small
.number of shares each. The lower court 22 was impressed by the fact that
the capital and surplus did not equal the current accounts receivable of the
corporation, because the coal was sold by it on 30, 60 and 90 days' time,
and while the evidence showed that the coal producing companies which had
sold coal to the corporation had not been in the habit of exacting immediate
payment, yet there was nothing to show they did not have the right to do so
"had the exigencies of their business demanded such payment," and the
court found that it certainly would not have been an unreasonable act on
the part of the officers and directors of the corporation to permit the accumu-
lation of a surplus sufficiently large to meet the possible requirements to pay
for the coal it purchased before its customers had paid their accounts.
One of the best known cases is the Cecil B. De Mille case.1 3 The de-
cision of the Board of Tax Appeals 14 was in favor of the taxpaying corpora-
tion, it appearing that a large part of the earnings, both of the corporation
and the preceding partnership, had been withheld from distribution to partners
11. 75 F. 2d 336, 337 (C. C. A. 6th 1935).
12. 3 F. Supp. 668 (W. D. Ky. 1933).
13. Cecil B. De Mille v. Commissioner, 31 B. T. A. 1161 (1936), aff'd, 90 F. 2d 12
(C. C. A. 9th 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 713 (1937).
14. 31 B. T. A. 1161 (1936).
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and to stockholders, and was invested in various properties and enterprises
and otherwise accumatlated in accordance with a consistent plan of the in-
dividaials (who were members of the partnership and later stockholders and
officers of the corporation) to build up an organization sufficiently financed
for the independent production of bttsiness. The stock of the corporation
was' closely held. The court there said :15
"Under oath, each flatly denied that the company was formed for the purpose
of preventing the imposition of surtax upon its shareholders; or that it was availed
of, or accumulated its profits for that purpose. They denied that the matter of sur-
tax avoidance by the shareholders was ever discussed, or that the possibility of such
avoidance was ever a consideration in determining the disposition of the company's
earnings. These denials remain unshaken by cross-examination. Of course, such
denials are not entirely controlling. Perhaps they are to be expected, for without
them there would be no controversy." [Italics added]
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the de-
cision of the Board of Tax Appeals.' 6 The opinion is quite brief, and the
Board of Tax Appeals was affirmed on the ground that the finding that the
company (n'6tbeing a mere holding or investment company) was neither
formed nor availed of for the purpose" of preventing the impqsition of sur-
taxes upon its share holders through the medium of permitting profits to
accumulate was a finding-of fact which will not be disturbed on appeal, where
it was supported by substantial evidence. In other words, so far as the
circuit court of appeals was concerned, it might have decided the case
either way had it been a court of original jurisdiction. Since certiorari
w as denied,V -there was. no opinion indicating whether the Supreme Court
would or would not have agreed with the result reached by the circuit court of
appeals simply upon the ground on which the circuit court of appeals based
its decision.
As far as has been found, the Supreme Court has considered similar
provisions in a. Revenue Act in only two cases. One of these cases is
Helvering v. National Grocery Company.'8 The Court in this case reversed
the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,'
9 the
circuit 'court of appeals having, in turn, reversed the decision of the Board
of Tax Appeals20 against the taxpayer. The other case was that of Helvering
v. Chicago Stock Yards Co.,21 where the commissioner was sustaided, and
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit holding in -favor of the
15. Id. at 1175.
16. 90 F. 2d 12 (C. C. A. 9th 1937).
17. 302 U. S. 713 (1937).
18. 304 U. S. 282 (1938).
19. 92 F. 2d 931, (C. C. A. 3d 1937).
20. 35 B. T. A. 163 (1936).
21. 318 U. S. 693 (1943).
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taxpaying corporation,2 2 was reversed, which decision, in turn, reversed
the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals against the taxpayer2 3
Both of these Supreme Court cases, decided against the taxpayer,
involved one man corporations, the National Grocery. Company having at
all times been a one man corporation, the stock being owned by a Mr. Kohl,
and the Stockyards Company having been a one man corporation for some
years, the stock being owned by a Mr. Prince. While both of these cases were
one man corporation cases, some of the statements in the opinion of the
Supreme Court aie of interest generally. Briefly, the facts in, the National.
Grocery Company case were that the corporation was formed in 1908, prior
to the first Income Tax Act of 1913. The case partially went off in the
Supreme Court on the ground that the circuit court of appeals had. made an
independent determination as upon a trial de nova of the issues.before the
Board. The Supreme Court held that there was evidence to support the
findings and decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals and -reversed the
circuit court of appeals, as stated. Since the decision of the Supreme Court
in the case of Dobson v. Commissioner,2 4 as to the finality, of findngs of
fact by the Board of Tax Appeals (now the Tax Court of the United
States), where the determinative issue is one of a state of mind, i.e., purpose,
which can ordinarily be ascertained as an inference to'be drawn from pos-
itive facts, it seems that it will be quite difficult in the future to have a
finding by the Tax Court on this question set aside, unless Section 10 of the
recently enacted Federal Administrative Procedure Act25 be applicable to
the review of decisions of the Tax Court. The letter of the Attorney
General to the Senate Judiciary Committee to the contrary notwithstanding,26
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in the recent case of
Lincoln Electric Co. v. Commissioner,27 concluded that a review- of Tax
Court decisions was governed by-the Administrative Procedure Act, but
did not deem it necessary to decide to what extent its power of review-had
been broadened, awaiting a case when clear cut questions of fact or mixed
questio9s of law and fact should be brought to the court for review29
Of course, since the corporation was formed prior to the leyying of any
such tax as that in question, there was no issue as to the corporation's
22. 129 F. 2d 937 (C. C. A. 1st 1942).
23. 41 B. T. A. 590 (1940).
24. 320 U. S. 489 (1943), rehearing denied, 321 U. S. 231 (1944).
25. 60 STAT. 237, 243 (1946).
26. This letter was written during the pendency of the bill. See 162 F. 2d 379, 382
(C. C. A. 6th 1947).
27. 162 F. 2d 379 (C. C. A. 6th 1947).
28. See Dickinson, Administrative Procedure Act: Scope and Grounds of Br-oadened
Judicial Review, 33 A. B. A. J. 434 (1947). See also Alexander Tax News Letter, June
14, 1947, 5218.
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having been formed for the prohibited pzwpose. The Supreme Court coin-
mented on subsection (b) of Section 104 of the Revenue Act of 192829
to the effect that the fact that the gains or profits,'were permitted' to ac-
cumulate beyond reason shall be prima facie evidence of a purpose to escape
the surtax. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Brandeis (Justices
McReynolds and Butler dissenting) commented upon the fact that Kohl,
the sole stockholder, drew a large yearly salary and, in addition, borrowed
heavily from 'the corporation, his borrowings for the seven year period prior
to January 31, 1931, aggregating $610,000. The Court quoted from the
opinion of the circuit court of appeals in the case of United Business Corpo-
ration v. Commissioner ° to the effect that such loans are incompatible with
a purpose to strengthen the financial position of petitioner, and entirely
accord with the desire to get the equivalent of his dividends under another
guise. The Court also held against the contention that the surplus was
accumulated for the reasonable needs of the business. It was true that the
corporation had been organized in 1908 as a small business of eleven grocery
stores, and had expanded to the ownership of 815 stores in 1936. Its capital
was $200,000, 'and in the ten year period preceding January 31, 1931, it
had accumulated surplus profits in the amount of $5,742,455.35; aid the
distribution of its surplus profits for the fiscal years 1930 and 1931 as
dividends would have caused Kohl to have paid substantial additional sur-
taxes. Of these large accumulated profits, on January 31, 1931, approxi-
mately four-fifths were in the form of bonds, stocks and excess cash. Kohl
testified that he estimated the cost of opening each new store to be about
$5,000. The Court found that the increase in the number of stores for the
ten year period in question when the stores in the chain increased from
358 to 815 could only account for about one-half of the profits accumulated,
noting that ".. . no conceivable expansion could have utilized so large a
surplus." 31
The Court further remarked that high taxes were first imposed in
1919, and that subsequently no dividend was paid until after the close of
the taxable year involved in the case.
It appeared that during the year 1931 there was depreciation in the
market value of securities held in an amount greater than the net income,
and the corporation contended that hence there were no gains or profits
realized in that year. The Court said that this was simply a matter of evi-
dence to be considered by the Commissioner and the Board in determining
the issue of fact whether the accumulated profits were in excess of the
29. 45 STAT. 814 (1928), 26 U. S. C. 2104 (1928).
30. 62 F. 2d 754, 755 (C. C. A. 2d 1933).
31. Helvering v. National Grocery Company, 304 U. S. 282, 294 (1938).
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reas6nable needs of the business; and remarked that depreciation in the
-market value of securities which the corporation continued to hold did not,
as a matter of law, preclude a finding that the accumulation -of the year's
profits was -in excess of the reasonable needs of the-business.
In the Chicago Stock Yards Crntpauy case32 it appeared that a Mr.
Prince became a stockholder in the Union Stockyards and Transit Company
in Chicago, which had been incorporated in 1865 to operate stockyards in
that 'city. In 1890 certain packers threatened to remove their plants from
Chicago unless they were given a share of the profits. Mr. Prince and other
stockholders met this situation by organizing a holding company under the
laws of New Jersey, the Chicago Junction Railways & Union Stockyards
Company. The new company issued bonds in the amount of $14,000,000
secured by its Transit Company stock. The new company later acquired
all of the stock of the Transit Company. By payments in cash and its own
bonds, it procured. from the packers an agreement to maintain the ,stock-
-yardg at their then location for fifteen years. When this agreement was about
'to expire, the packers presented fresh demands, and Mr. Prince organized
in 1911 the Chicago Stockyards Company as a Maine corporation, which
purchased all of the stock of the New Jersey company by giving it $200 par
of its five per cent bonds for each share of stock, stamped with the company's
agreement to pay a nine per cent dividend. Armour & Company was given
'twenty per cent of the respondent's stock, Mr. Prince retaining eighty per
-cent. Pursuant to an anti-trust case degree, Armour had to part with its
interest in the stockyards, and Mr. Prince acquired this stock.
Since the charter of the New Jersey company was to expire in 1940,
Mr. Prince formulated the plan of accumulating cash in the respondent's
treasury sufficient to pay the debts of the New Jersey corporation, and to
liquidate it by that time. This would require the redemption of the out-
standing preferred stock at par and the payment of the $14,000,000 mortgage
and over $6,000,000 of fixed obligations of subsidiaries, which had been
guaranteed by' the New Jersey company, and it would also be necessary
'to purchase some 6,258 shares of the New Jersey company's common stock,
'not then owned, or, in other -words, there would have been an expenditure
of about $28,000,000 by 1940. I-f this were done, then the Maine company
would own the entire enterprise, clear of debts other than its own bonds
outstanding in the amount of $3,227,000, due in 1961. In the year in question
-the enterprise as a whole had cash and liquid assets amounting to some
421,000,000, and fixed and other assets of a book value of $40,000,000. The
)ulk of the liquid assets had been drawn into the treasury of the Maine
corporation. The Maine corporation's assets on December 31, 1939, ex-
32. 318 U. S. 693 (1943).
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ceeded its liabilities, including its capital stock, by some $19,000,000, and
from thdtdate to the close of 1933 its earnings were some $10,000,000, of
which ohly $1,600,000 was paid out in dividends.
The Court declined to consider the question of whether or not the
Maine corporation was a mere holding or investment company, to-wit,
nothing but a pocketbook for Mr. Prince.
It further said, however, that while the company was not formed for
the purpose of avoiding the surtax on its stockholders, yet the corporate
practice adopted ". . . for mere convenience or other reasons, and without
tax significance when adopted, may have been continued with the additional
motive of avoiding surtax on the stockholders. The Board's conclusion may
justifiably have been reached in the view that, whatever the motive when
the practice of accumulation was adopted, the purpose of avoiding surtax
induced, or aided in inducing,, the continuance of the practice."
The Court said the situation was similar in legal effect to that presented
in the National Grocery Company case and said that although Mr. Prince
denied any purpose to avoid surtaxes, the Board, as in the National Grocery
Cocmpany case, was free to conclude from all of the evidence that such
was .the purpose. The Court then answered the position or contention of
the respondent as follows:
"The respondent's position is that,.as the New Jersey Company's charter was t>
expire in 1940, and as respondent was under what it deemed a moral and, indeed, a
legal obligation to pay off the mortgage debts of the New Jersey Company and its.
subsidiaries- and to redeem its outstanding stock, the accumulation of earnings was
necessary to the preservation of its business. There are two sufficient answers. Mr.
Prince, the sole stockholder, if in receipt of the respondent's earnings, could equally
well have done what the respondent proposed to do, that is, turn accumulated earn-
ings into invested capital. And the evidence shows that the New Jersey Company's.
charter could have been renewed in 1940. Continuance or refinancing of such an.
enterprise on the face of things vould have been practicable."
An analysis of the cases indicates that there is little tO fear if an
industrial corporation, as distinguished from an investment or holding
company, retains assets to invest in additional plant and equipnent.m It
appears from the opinion in the Dill case 34 that the taxpaying' corporation
had a capital of $100,000 and a surplus of $746,458.46; and' had at the
end of the year some cash and something over $300,000 invested in Govern-
ment bonds. However, most of the surplus resulted from severit years"
accumula'tf6ns. This surplus represented physical plant and improved manu-
facturing' facilities. The corporation had thus been able to sustain an increase
in its income on which income tax had previously been paid. The court said:
"Justice Holmes once said 'A page of history is worth a volume of logic,' Ncw
York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345. Thus, the economic history of the country
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* and this company is both pertinent and illuminating. So, particularly where, as here,
the petitioner is not a holding company but is engaged in a manufacturing business,
which is ,so.obviously hazardouts from a business viewpoint, we will hesitate before
•stibstituting~our judgment upon the reasonableness of the corporate accumulations,
, for'that: of the directors. See Kittg & Smith Co., 18 B. T. A. 966.
S:'The attitude of. petitioner toward its earlier gains and profits may have a
bearing *upon the reasonableness of the accumulation existing in the tax year. See
United Business Corporation of America v. Commissioner, supra; and C. H. Spitzner
& Sons; -Inc.,. supra, But respondent- points to the large corporate surplus account
of petitioner in the .tax -year as.constituting 'accumulated gains and profits' under
the act. However, the, greater. part of this surplus is the result of accumulations
over many years and .represents physical plant - and improved manufacturing fa-
cilities by which the petitioner has been enabled to sustain ana increase its income
upon which it has already paid income tax." [Emphasis added]
However, where a' company has -a 'large portion of its assets in liquid
form,. it is highly desirable to, be able to show that within a. reasonable
time expansion will occur through the purchase of plant or equipment or the
making of improveinents, or at least that active efforts are being made ato
locate an6ther plant or to prepare for the making of such, expenditures.
Indefinite contemplated plans of expansion, without' any action- in that
direction, are not sufficient.85
In both the Perry 6 case and the Wilke'son0 3 7 case, the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided ad.verseljr to the taxpayer, largely
upon the proposition that the adverse findings br the Board of Tax Appeals
were questions of fact. In the Perry case the court went into the facts, and
from the opinion it appears that the taxpayer contended that the undistributed
income of the corporation was reasonably required by it for cantemplated
repairs and working capital. J. M. Perry & Company was engaged in the
business of cold storage and warehousing in the State 'of Washington. It did
not make the repairs contemplated. In finding against the corporation on its
contention that this undistributed income was reasonably irequired by it ,for
contemplated repairs and working capital, the circuit court said:
"It appears that the taxpayer corporation was engaged in the busiiess of cold
storage and warehousing in Yakima, Washington. It maintained- i. cold st6rage
plant, divided into four units, having a total capacity of 490,000 boxes of fruit. It
presented evidence to the effect that various alterations and repairs to its plant were
contemplated in the tax years. Other witnesses for the taxpayer testified that V250,-
33. See Dill 'Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 39 B. T. A. 1023 (1939); J. E. Baker Co.
v. Commissioner, B. T. A. Memo Opinion Docket No. 87758 (June 9, 1939).
34. Dill Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 33.
35. See .j. M. Perry & Co. v. Commissioner, B. T. A. Memorandum Opinion Dockets
92,275 and 94,523, aff'd, 120 F. 2d 123 (C. C. A. 9th 1941). See also Wilkerson Daily
Corporation v. Commissioner, 125 F. 2d 998, (C. C. A. 9th 1942).
36. J. M. Perry & Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 35.
37. Wilkerson Daily Corp. v. Commissioner, supra note 35.
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000 was a reasonable amount for a business of the size and character of that of tax-
payer to retain on hand for working capital, including financing of growers. -
"Taxpayer's balance sheets for 1935 and 1936 disclose the following: On De-
cember 31, 1935, taxpayer had on hand over $150,000 cash, and almost $49,000 in
United States and other bonds. On this same day it owed in accounts payable, only
the sum of $312.16. On December 31, 1936 the cash on hand had increased to over
$ 68,000, and the investment in bonds had increased to over $71,000. The acebunts
payable amounted to only $843.87.
"As against the taxpayer's evidence as to contemplated repairs and necessary
working capital, it was sdeveloped that the contemplated alterations and repairs have
never been made, and that the peak of the taxpayer's financing loans in 1935 and
1936 amounted to approximately $35,000." [Italics added]
The court then remarked that in spite of the fact that the taxpayer
contended that it needed to maintain this large cash reserve on hand, it
proceeded to make various investments, which had no relation to its storage
business, citing an instance in 1"934 when it purchased some mining stock
wkich it sold in 1935 at a profit of nearly $48,000; another instance cited
was when the corporation purchased in 1935 forty-five residential lots in
Yakima, Washington, and commenced construction of some houses; 'still
another instance was when it purchased a banking building in Yakima wlich
was sold to its principal stockholder, Perry, in 1936, at its cost price, a d the
price was charged to Perry's account; and, finally, it had loaned in 1935
various amounts to individuals not in any manner connected with its fruit
business, these loans aggregating about $100,000 (and in the year 1936 Perry
borrowed from the corporation over $30,000). Of course, these latter
matters made the case somewhat harder for the taxpayer, but they do not
detract fsom the general statement.
In Wilkerson Daily Corporation v. Comnmissionwr38 all of the stock was
finally owned by two stockholders, Mr. Wilkerson and his mother, Mr.
Wilkerson owning the larger share. In the fiscal year ending November 31,
1931, there was a loss, but thereafter, in the fiscal years through the .one
ending July 31, 1936, there were small profits until the said last fiscal year,
when there was a profit of some $58,000. In none of the years were any
dividends declared. If dividends had.been paid, Wilkerson would have had
to pay surtax on the additional income therefrom. There was present the
important element that Mr. Wilkerson borrowed from the corporation from
year to year, so that in the fiscal year ending July 31, 1936, he owed the
corporation nearly $70,000. However, on the point here in question, the
Court said:
"Wilkerson testified that the purpose of permitting petitioner's gains and lirofits
to accumulAte instead of being divided or distributed was to enable petitioner to ex-
pand its corporate business and to provide a reserve for certain contingencies. The
38. 125 F. 2d 998 (C. C. A. 9th 1942).
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Board did not credit this iestimony. Instead, the Board noted that the expansion
plans testified to by Wilkerson were never carried out, and that the failure to carry
them out was not satisfactorily explained. To the Board, moreover, the purpose
mentioned by Wilkerson seemed inconsistent with petitioner's action in making
loans to Wilkerson." [Italics added]
In the recent case of Lion Clothing Co. v. Commussioner,39 the decision
was in favor of the taxpayer. In the years 1940 and 1941, after federal taxes,
approximately twenty-five per cent of the net profits was distributed in
dividends, and the balance was added to earned surplus, and in the year
1942 about one-third was distributed as dividends, and the balance was
added to earned surplus. The concern was an old merchandising one in San
Diego, which city grew rapidly. In the depression years of 1930, 1931 and
1932 the company had suffered losses, banks to which it was indebted
had forced it to reduce its inventory in order to pay them off, and the presi-
dent loaned it an amount, which indebtedness he forgave. These experiences
with the bank and the depreciation losses made a deep impression on the
mind of John H. Fox, who became President in 1939 after the death of
his father, the former President, Samuel I. Fox.
In 1938 the directors adopted a motion in regard to future earnings
of the company so that a definite policy should be followed: to pay $20,000
a year to the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company to which there was
owing approximately $205,000 on a mortgage on the building, which was
assumed at the time of acquisition; second, to pay bonuses;' and, third, of
any earnings, at least fifty per cent should go into surplus "so that the
company should have funds for expansion m any unseen business depression
that might occur."
The court remarked that -the petitioner needed new fixtures for its
store, new lighting equipment and new fronts, and needed a freight' elevator
very badly, but decided not to put it in until it paid off its debts and built
up a reserve; that it estimated that its inventory would have to he expanded
after the war some $100,000, or to an amount three times as great as the
inventory at the end of 1942 and fifty per cent more than the inventory at
the end of 1939. At the end of 1942, the net asset position, exclusive of
inventories, was approximately three to two.
The court had no reasonable doubt of the petitioner's estimate that
$100,000 would be needed to enlarge inventories or that $50,000 would be
needed to increase the size of its accounts receivable, .and that in addition
it would need some $100,000 to purchase the stock interest of a closely
related business which operated a women's ready-to-wear department in
petitioner's place of business.
The court referred to the resolution adopted in 1938, stating:
39. 8 T. C. Docket No. 5370 (June 17, 1947).
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"The reason we Think that earnings and profits of petitioner were not tccumu-
lated beyond the reasonable needs of its business is because petitioner lia4 proved
by evidence which seems convincing to us that in the year 1938 it adopted by appro-
priate corporate action a policy of acpmulating a part of its net profits each year
to be added to surplus 'so that the company have funds for expansion pr any unseen
depression that might occur,' and that this policy under all the circumstances of the
case was a reasonable one and has been carried out, including the taxable years
which we have before us. We do not think it can be said that a taxpayer's earnings
were accumulated beyond the reasonable needs of the business where it is shown that
the purpose of their accumulation is to retire mortgage indebtedness, to make im-
provements which will add to the convenience and efficiency of operati6n of the
business, -to expand operations by purchasing the interests of concessionaires, to ac-
cumulate some cash reserves as a bulwark against future depressions, and to meet
unknown risks of the war and post-war period."
The court further stated that the case was more akin 'to thai of
General Smelting Co. v. Commissioner ° than to the case relied 'upon by the
Commissioner.41 In the latter case there were larger loans to stockholders
and in addition there was a large investment in an 'wrelated corporation.
It was mainly because of these facts that the court held that in' the taxable
year in question the taxpayer corporation, by permitting its earnings and
profits to accumulate instead of being distributed, bad been used for the
purpose of .preventing the imposition of the surtax upon the stockholders.
As do many others, the writer feels that as far as possible from the
standpoint of. a sound taxing system, a statute which predicates liability for
a tax on intent,'motive or purpose, as distinguished from actions'and objective
matters, should not be enacted. The consequent uncertainty as to what a
court may hold years later was the motive or purpose does not conduce to
sound business administration.
While the revenue may have to be protected by some law to prevent
wide-spread avoidance of individual surtaxes by stockholders in closed
corporations; we must not overlook the fact that directors of such corporations
are influenced in many instances to try to avoid the attempted' application of
Section 102 to their corporations, or perhaps a claim of personal liability
by minority stockholders in the light of developments in the Trico matter,
and, in so 'doing, to distribute as dividends more earnings than would be
justified by an eye solely to what is best for the corporations concerned.
This is especially true now when the replacement of inventory and capital
assets is on an increasing cost scale and we see corporations with good
earnings borrowing for the-said purposes, as well as for ,expansion. Small
businesses must be allowed to grow, as in the past, if the capitalistic system
is to function successfully and, perhaps, survive.
40. 4 T. C. 313 (1944).
41. Whitney Chain and Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T. C. 1109 (1944), dff'd, 149
F. 2d 936 (C. C. A. 2d 1945).
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In the case of individuals and firms, engaged in.business, their troubles,
in this regard, would be largely relieved by a substantial decrease in personal
income tax rates. In the case of corporations, any further decrease in rates
is improbable in the near future, and I thoroughly agree with the eleventh
recommendation of the Special Tax Sfudy Committee, of which Mr. Roswell
Magill was Chairman, that Section 102 should be modified so as to
(1) place upon the Commissioner the burden of proving that earnings or
profits have been unreasonably accumulated; (2) limit the tax to the
portion of Section 102 income that is unreasonably. .accumulated and
(3) permit dividends paid within 75 days after the end of th4 tax year to
be deducted in computing Section 102 income for such year. Such modifi-
cation would be helpful.
